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The Olympic Model: Mitigating Financial Corruption in Collegiate Athletics 
Payton Larsen 
Director: Mr. Tom Martin 
 In this paper, I review the immense commercialization of collegiate athletics and 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) strict adherence to its principle of 
amateurism.  With legal attention regarding antitrust infringement and illegal activity in 
recruiting practices, the NCAA and its member institutions face increasing challenges to 
their operations which were originated for an activity that is a minor semblance of its 
current state.  As a whole, collegiate athletics have evolved into a billion-dollar industry, 
yet the form of compensation for the individuals generating the demand has remained 
stagnant.  To address this discrepancy, I determine fair market value calculations utilizing 
financial reports from university athletic departments and corresponding professional 
revenue-sharing agreements to discern the value of a student-athlete’s participation.  My 
paper delves into the potential resolutions the NCAA may consider, and the subsequent 
issues that implementation may provoke.  Specifically, I analyze the Olympic model and 
its ability to move toward fair student-athlete compensation while retaining the NCAA’s 
purpose. 
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 Recent years for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its 
member institutions could be characterized as the best or the worst of times depending on 
the narrative portrayed.  Monetarily, billion-dollar media contracts have been signed and 
compensation packages for coaches and conference commissioners have grown to 
millions of dollars.  Numerous college athletes have reached celebrity status, television 
viewership has never been higher, and graduation rates remain slightly above national 
averages (Sanderson & Siegfried, 2016).  Contrarily, the NCAA’s policies have received 
significant attention stemming from antitrust lawsuits, criminal charges in relation to 
recruiting practices, and stagnant student-athlete compensation despite significant 
revenue growth.  As monetization of collegiate athletic participation continues to take 
place, the NCAA will be forced to examine the shortcomings of its current system, and 
potentially consider a new framework to effectively manage the business it has created.  
The Olympic model, which permits individuals access to the free market of 
commercialization, may be the most feasible and comprehensive solution available. 
A Brief History of the NCAA 
 The NCAA has a deeply-rooted history in America, and has greatly influenced the 
rise of intercollegiate athletics through its regulations and commercial activity.  In 1905, 
President Roosevelt commissioned a rules committee to address rising concerns over the 
safety of football played on college campuses, and in 1910, the NCAA was born (Smith, 
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2014).  The initial purpose of the NCAA was to formulate rules for various 
intercollegiate sports, however, its mission quickly evolved as the popularity of college 
athletics grew and competition intensified.  Fast forward to the present, and the NCAA 
and its member institutions have created their own industry of commercialization with 
nationally-televised games, million-dollar contract signings, and aggressive merchandise 
promotions.  This evolution in demand has also created a need for an evolution in 
regulation, but in large part, the NCAA’s original policies remain in effect today.  
 Specifically, the NCAA’s interpretation of amateurism has received the most 
attention from participants and non-participants alike.  According to its website, the 
NCAA requires its student-athletes to pass and adhere by amateurism standards, which 
forbid: “salary for participation in athletics, prize money above expenses, play with 
professionals, and involvement with an agent” (“Amateurism,” 2014).  Numerous 
individuals have voiced their concerns over this standard, criticizing its breach of 
antitrust in the wake of collegiate athletics’ rise to commercial prominence.  To take a 
step back, the United States government enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to 
oppose the use of trusts, monopolies, or cartels that harm free and open trade (“The 
Antitrust Laws,” 2017).  Essentially, this law prohibits the restraint of a free market, 
which has consistently been present in legal action pursued against the NCAA.  
Legal Attention 
White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 VBF (C.D. Cal. Jan 29, 2008) 
 In 2008, the NCAA agreed to set aside $10 million and pay up to $8.9 million in 
attorney fees in order to settle an antitrust suit regarding an unfair capping of scholarships 
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awarded to athletes.  The case was spearheaded by former Stanford football player, Jason 
White, and marked an increased awareness to the cost of attendance discussion.  The 
argument was centered around induced hardships because of the time-constraints student-
athletes face, creating an inability to earn part-time income.  The $10 million was made 
available on a claim basis over a three-year span to Division 1 football and basketball 
players to be used for educational purposes; however, the NCAA admitted no 
wrongdoing as part of the settlement. 
Northwestern Univ., Case 13-RC-121359 (N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 16, 2014) 
 Northwestern University football players have also brought their concerns to 
presiding legal authority, originating on the basis of student-athlete time demands, 
increasing revenue generated by college sports, and a lack of voice on issues such as 
safety and long-term health care.  The National Labor Relations Board ultimately 
dismissed the players’ petition to unionize, disallowing their ability to collectively 
bargain as university employees.  The ruling was predominantly met with relief by those 
involved in the matter, as the uncertainty surrounding a different outcome could have 
resulted in a chaotic reorganization.  However, the Northwestern student-athletes 
collectively brought more attention to the NCAA’s regulation, pioneering the 
conversation on the discrepancy of power between the NCAA and student-athletes.  
O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) 
 The O’Bannon case initially gained notoriety when Ed O’Bannon—a former 
UCLA basketball player—noticed himself in an EA Sports video game, and challenged 
the use of player likenesses by the NCAA.  The case eventually morphed into a closer 
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look at the television revenues earned by the organization, and the lack of compensation 
to the ones who were creating that money: the players.  After multiple years of litigation, 
U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken ultimately rejected the challenges, but 
recognized that the NCAA is, “not above antitrust laws,” and that its rules had been too 
restrictive in maintaining amateurism.  As a result, the NCAA was required to permit its 
member schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student-athletes—a 
stipend above the discrete cost of college to address transportation spending, personal 
expenses, etc.  The case clarified numerous legal concerns surrounding the NCAA, but 
certainly did not end the discussion.  
Illegal Activity 
 Not only have the NCAA’s standards been legally challenged in excess of the 
presented cases, its member institutions have also challenged how strictly the 
organization regulates and enforces those standards.  While the ruling of amateurism was 
founded with good intent—to foster a competitive landscape, and to retain the focus on 
education for students who also happen to play sports—the anticompetitive nature of the 
regulation has created a black-market in this evolving industry.  In a league dictated by 
the success of recruiting teenagers to enroll at a given school, the NCAA must be aware 
of activities that could potentially sway the minds of said teenagers and their families.  In 
fact, there have already been numerous investigations of member institutions, which 
could just be the tip of the iceberg. 
 For the purposes of this paper, illegal activities will not be explored in depth, but 
the multitude of their occurrences is valuable to note as changing the NCAA’s current 
system could help evade these negative externalities.  Rubenstein’s (2017) article 
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examines criminal investigations on university athletic departments, dating as early as 
1973 when Southwestern Louisiana was found guilty by the NCAA for paying players 
cash and interfering with GPAs.  In 1987, Southern Methodist University received 
penalties for illegally paying football recruits.  The early 2000s saw the Universities of 
Ohio State and Southern California receive sanctions for their players receiving hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in illegal benefits, resulting in a forfeited Heisman Trophy 
(Rubenstein, 2017).  And most recently in 2018, dozens of prominent basketball 
programs have been investigated by the FBI for illegal recruiting processes.  This list 
certainly does not represent the entirety of NCAA investigations, but the impression that 
the principle of amateurism creates more suspect activity than the NCAA is capable of 
















 Student-athletes who are fortunate enough to be offered a scholarship do 
technically receive compensation in exchange for their athletic participation.  In an article 
from CNN, Val Ackerman and Larry Scott (2016)—commissioners of the Big East and 
Pac-12 conferences, respectively—argue that a free education is more than enough in 
terms of remuneration.  Not only do student-athletes receive an academic scholarship, 
“they also get high quality medical care, academic support, and quality travel 
experiences.”  Additionally, Ackerman and Scott reference slightly higher graduation 
rates for athletes compared to other college students, and mention former players who are 
now executives thanks to their education and experiences as student-athletes (Ackerman 
& Scott, 2016).  Their argument carries weight—the cost of college has grown 
tremendously, and the majority of students who do not receive an athletic scholarship 
face substantial debt upon graduation.  The debate, however, is not whether student-
athletes receive valuable compensation, but rather, the question lies in if they receive the 
appropriate value for what they create.  For full disclosure, USA Today reported that 
Larry Scott was paid $4.2 million in 2015 for his role as Pac-12 commissioner 
(Berkowitz, 2017).  
 Also, the time and effort demands of collegiate athletics far surpass those of a 
typical full-time job.  According to the NCAA’s 2016 Study of the Student-Athlete 
Experience, Division 1 football players reported spending a median of 42 hours per week 
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on athletic pursuits and 38.5 hours per week on academics (“GOALS,” 2016).  
Combined, these figures result in an average of 80.5 hours each week devoted to 
maintaining athletic scholarships.  The value of a full-ride scholarship may be 
comparable to an average salary of a full-time job, but not many full-time jobs require an 
average work time of 80.5 hours per week.  
 Furthermore, the long hours and diligent work would certainly be worth the 
chance at a professional contract, but unfortunately, a major discrepancy exists between 
the proportion of college athletes who think they will play professionally compared to the 
proportion of those who actually do.  From an NCAA study in 2011, 76% of Division 1 
men’s basketball players reported that they were at least ‘somewhat likely’ to become a 
professional and/or Olympic athlete in their sport (“FARA,” 2011).  In actuality, the 
NCAA reported in 2017 that only 1.1% of NCAA players will be drafted in the NBA, and 
only 19.1% will play some form of professional basketball (“Estimated,” 2017).  These 
opportunities include the NBA, NBA G-League, and international leagues—which are far 
more abundant than the possibilities in football.  58% of Division 1 football players 
believed they were ‘somewhat likely’ to play professionally, when in reality, only 1.9% 
will play in the NFL, Canadian Football League, or Arena Football League.  The gaping 
difference is the same for other sports too, including baseball, hockey, and women’s 
basketball.  Although the responses are limited to ‘somewhat likely,’ the opportunity to 
make a living as a professional athlete is largely overestimated by NCAA participants. 
 Clearly, the NCAA faces a multitude of challenges with its current system that the 
organization will eventually have to address.  Competition is only intensifying and 
commercialization is only increasing, in fact, resolution to this issue is far overdue.  In 
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1995, Walter Byers (the NCAA executive director from 1951 to 1987) argued in his 
memoir titled Unsportsmanlike Conduct that the NCAA no longer represented a student 
activity, but rather, a commercial enterprise.  He poignantly states, “amateurism is not a 
moral issue; it is an economic camouflage for monopoly practice” (Byers, 1995).  At the 
end of Byers’s tenure, in 1988, the NCAA signed a media rights agreement with CBS 
worth $55 million per year.  In 2017, the comparable NCAA media rights agreement was 
worth $771 million per year (“Where,” 2018).  Yet, athlete compensation barely budged, 
merely progressing from an academic scholarship to the current allowance of full cost of 
















Fair Market Values 
 In an attempt to determine an accurate fair market value of college athletes, I 
utilized the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics database and the current 
revenue sharing percentages of the NFL and NBA (“Equity,” 2017).  Each year, every 
NCAA institution is mandated by equity initiatives to report financial information on the 
revenues and expenses created by their athletic programs.  For the purposes of this paper, 
I only gathered information on the top two revenue-generating sports (football and men’s 
basketball), and included only the highest ten revenue-generating universities for each 
sport in the table below.  The fair market value calculation was determined utilizing the 
figures outlined in the NFL and NBA collective bargaining agreements, which guarantee 
a minimum of 47% and 50%, respectively, of all revenues generated to be allocated to the 
players (Gaines, 2017).  Although equitable distribution within each college team is not 
likely to be realistic, I believe it is a valuable demonstration to divide a team’s fair market 
value by the number of scholarships available (85 for football and 13 for basketball) to 
emulate a per-athlete basis.  Multiplying the per-athlete figure by four, results in a four-







Table 1: Fair Market Value Calculation – Football 
 
(Data reported to the US Department of Education representing July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017) 
Table 2: Fair Market Value Calculation – Men’s Basketball 
 
(Data reported to the US Department of Education representing July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017) 
 The resulting numbers are remarkable.  At the University of Louisville, the men’s 
basketball team generated over $45 million from July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017.  Taking 
into consideration the corresponding revenue-sharing agreements from professional 
sports and dividing equally among scholarship athletes, a single player would be worth 
over $1.7 million in fair market value.  For comparison, the 2017 in-state cost of 
attendance at the University of Louisville—or the value of an in-state, student-athlete’s 
scholarship—was approximately $27,000 (“University,” 2017).  Granted, this does not 
necessarily compare apples to apples.  As one can imagine, there are certainly differences 
between the operations of professional and collegiate athletics, therefore, using 
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professional revenue-sharing agreements in a collegiate fair market value calculation is 
intended as a baseline reference rather than a foregone conclusion.   
 The million-dollar question persists—how can the NCAA properly allocate the 
money generated by certain sports without destroying the system and the industry 
altogether?  For starters, there are benefits to the current model.  In the University of 
Oklahoma’s case, total revenue from all sports exceeded total expenses in 2017, creating 
the opportunity for that money to be used elsewhere (“Equity,” 2017).  OU’s president, 
David Boren, has stated that the athletics department at Oklahoma has used profits from 
its football-ticket sales to contribute over $25 million to the university for faculty, library, 
and academic support over recent years (Mussatto, 2016).  On the other hand, the 
University of Tulsa (another NCAA Division 1 school in the state of Oklahoma) operated 
its athletic department at a loss in 2017.  In fact, the majority of NCAA member schools 
do not generate a profit from the aggregate of their offered sports (“Equity,” 2017).  So, 
while the perception that the highest earning schools could easily muster the money to 
pay their athletes is warranted, that story does not hold true throughout the entirety of the 
sample. 
 Additionally, equitable payments across sports present an important dynamic.  
According to Cork Gaines (2017) from Business Insider, the average amount of revenue 
made by a Division 1 football team surpasses the average revenues generated by all other 
collegiate sports combined.  Most notably, the University of Texas—the school that earns 
the highest overall revenue from all of its offered sports—receives 70% of its athletics 
revenue solely from its football program (Gaines, 2017).  Even though a full-ride 
scholarship for baseball is worth the same amount as a full-ride scholarship for football, 
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the ideology behind equal payments to scholarship athletes regardless of sport does not 
make sense when one is disproportionately generating more money than the other.  If 
student-athletes were to be paid by the NCAA, would each sport have to be paid 
equitably? 
 This question brings another facet to the impartiality conversation: gender equity.  
The NCAA strictly adheres to Title IX standards, which require schools to, “provide 
equitable opportunities for women and men to participate in sports,” and that, “female 
and male student-athletes [must] receive athletic scholarship dollars proportional to their 
participation” (“Women,” 2018).  In other words, if the NCAA or any of its member 
schools were to pay student-athletes, they would be required to pay women and men 
proportional amounts.  The revenue statistics from the Department of Education show 
that female athletics do not generate anywhere near the amount of money that male sports 
do, essentially thwarting the idea of accurately compensating the student-athletes for 
what they generate in the first place (“Equity,” 2017).  Succinctly, numerous roadblocks 
stand in the way of the NCAA and its member institutions’ ability to directly pay student-
athletes anything exceeding the cost of attendance, but clearly, fair compensation is being 










The Olympic Model 
 A potential compromise for both student-athletes and the NCAA was uniquely 
presented in the unionization attempt of the Northwestern football players, “eliminate 
restrictions on players’ ability to directly benefit from commercial opportunities” 
(“N.L.R.B,” 2014).  Essentially, the Olympic model.  The Olympic model is distinct from 
the NCAA’s current system in that its definition of amateurism grants athletes the ability 
to access the free market of commercialization (Connelly, 2017).  This could include 
endorsement deals, commercials, autographs, etc. while the NCAA and its member 
institutions do not pay a cent.  In fact, the Olympic model would take the entire 
compensation conundrum out of the NCAA’s hands, while keeping the major premises of 
the system intact.  The Olympic model is not free of faults, but it may be the most 
effective solution available.  
 First, unwinding the amateurism rule will rid the NCAA of antitrust concerns.  
Under the current ruling, college athletes are not allowed to receive any type of pay for 
their athletic abilities, and are prompted at the conference level to sign waivers forfeiting 
their publicity rights without compensation (Keilman & Hopkins, 2015).  The main issue 
at hand is centered around an athlete’s name, image, and likeness (NIL), which member 
institutions and media affiliates use in promotion of games, memorabilia, and various 
other items.  Famously, the case of Johnny Manziel (the 2012 Heisman Trophy winning 
quarterback from Texas A&M) is often brought to the forefront when examining the 
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potential revenue generation of a single player.  From ticket and jersey sales, to win 
bonuses and auctioned dinners, Manziel was undoubtedly an integral part of vaulting 
A&M into one of the highest-earning athletic programs in the country.  However, he 
received the same scholarship compensation as the third-string quarterback who never 
played a down.  Had the NCAA’s interpretation of amateurism been less stringent, 
Manziel’s NIL could have earned him a large sum of money while in college, and the 
right to do so would have cost the university and the NCAA nothing—except possibly a 
decrease in their own earnings off him.  
 Not to be ignored, the third-string quarterback at Texas A&M did greatly benefit 
from the NCAA’s current system—as do numerous student-athletes who play lower 
revenue-generating sports and/or attend lower revenue-generating schools.  In fact, the 
majority of athletic departments are not even self-sufficient.  Using data from fiscal year 
2008, the NCAA reported that on average, student fees make up 25% of total revenues 
earned by Football Championship Subdivision programs (Fulks, 2009).  If member 
institutions were to increase student-athlete compensation directly, that increase would 
likely come at the expense of additional student costs for a significant number of 
universities.  Under the Olympic model, member institutions would not be forced to 
attain supplement resources to pay student-athletes anything above what they currently 
do, and the individuals who are unable to generate value in a free market would still earn 
an education in exchange for their athletic participation.  In short, the Olympic model 
advocates for student-athletes earning exactly what they are worth—no more and no less, 
and at the discretion of the individual.  
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 The Olympic model does bring about logistical concerns, though, such as 
university affiliations, differing brands, and recruiting impacts.  Any proposed change to 
the current system will have to come with a new set of rules—a potentially important one 
being university affiliation.  For example, if a college athlete were to be featured in a 
Nike advertisement, would he or she be allowed to adorn anything university affiliated?  
Simplicity would argue no, as that would require university approval, an allocation of the 
revenues, and a deviation from the separation of the NCAA and student-athlete 
commercialization.  Along similar lines, an explicit ruling would need to be in place 
regarding university sponsorship versus athlete sponsorship.  An Adidas-sponsored 
school would be expected to require all athletes to wear Adidas team-affiliated products 
on the playing field regardless of a player’s brand endorsement.  This could be 
imperative, since many universities typically receive lucrative apparel contracts.  
Ensuring the validity of those contracts would maintain income streams for athletic 
departments to use toward funding lower-income sports whose athletes may not have 
similar commercialization potential.  And finally, the soundness and legality of recruiting 
will likely forever contain a labyrinth of implications, but the NCAA could potentially 
take a step in the right direction under the Olympic model.  The task is no small feat, but 
bringing all activity into the light may advocate for a cleaner, more socially responsible 
process to the persuasion of high school athletes’ decisions.  After all, it certainly is not a 
secret that money is already an issue in recruiting, but whether the NCAA is willing to 
openly declare recruiting an arms race is a major hurdle.  
 Under the Olympic model, it would be legal for boosters from the wealthiest 
programs to essentially pay top recruits to attend their school.  This is not necessarily an 
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issue for recruiting outcomes, as top programs already secure the highest-rated recruits 
year in and year out.  The process of which they are doing so, however, could be flipped 
on its head, as tremendous amounts of money may no longer be thrown at universities for 
coaching salaries and state-of-the-art facilities to attract players.  If boosters can instead 
legally pay athletes directly, schools’ funding sources may whither.  This would most 
certainly have an impact on athletic departments, but it could potentially reach academic 
support as well.  There is no way to ascertain the magnitude of the potential repercussions 
under a different recruiting landscape, however, the NCAA will be expected to retain 
jurisdiction over new policies.  Kahn (2007) argues that the economics of recruiting is 
already an inefficient allocation of resources, therefore, an open market with continued 
NCAA regulation might advocate for a more productive process.  His justification is 
rooted in the demand and supply equilibrium that member institutions would no longer be 
entirely responsible for (Kahn, 2007).  Under a revised NCAA system, recruiting 
reformation will be inevitable—the Olympic model could potentially offer an 
economically efficient solution.  
 Above all, the foundational concern of the Olympic model is the impact that 
commercialization might have on student-athletes, however, education and pay are not 
mutually exclusive.  Consider a hypothetical example of a high-school student who plans 
to study business in college.  Not only does the student plan to garner a business degree 
through higher education, he or she also has a talent for painting that is worth value in the 
market for art work.  Imagine that the student painted a piece that an alumnus of a local 
college has the desire to purchase for $100,000.  In fact, the alumnus says he or she will 
purchase the student’s art work and fund additional commissioned pieces if the student 
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decides to study business at the alumnus’s school.  If the market deems the student’s 
work worthy of those prices, then the student is encouraged to capture the value he or she 
has created.  Why is the situation different for a college athlete who has a talent worth 
value to buyers in the market for sports?  The argument that athletes would not be able to 
adequately manage academics, sports, and commercialization restricts the value-creating 
individuals of their own decision.  First and foremost, just as the student could have 
declined the alumnus’s offer, and instead focused his or her attention elsewhere in 
college, student-athletes can choose not to participate in commercial activity.  Second, 
student-athletes who generate demand have the option to hire an agent to manage those 
demands, easing time constraints and scheduling conflicts.  And finally, the educational 
standards of the NCAA will still be in place to ensure student-athletes meet GPA and 
credit requirements, and university athletic departments will still have the ability to 
formulate their own policies on practice and class attendance. After all, a student-athlete 













 From the origin of on-campus football rules in 1910, to millions of spectators 
around the world watching championship games in 2018, collegiate athletics have 
drastically evolved throughout the existence of the NCAA.  During that time, however, 
the system that the organization and its member institutions have operated under has 
barely budged, resulting in numerous court cases, institutional investigations, and 
significant media attention.  When the NCAA finally recognizes the need for reformation, 
the Olympic model offers a comprehensive solution to relieve the NCAA of antitrust 
concerns, appropriately compensate student-athletes who generate significant demand, 
and preserve the benefits of student-athlete scholarships.  Under the Olympic model, the 
ruling of amateurism will need to become more flexible in order to permit student-
athletes access to the free market of commercialization.  However, the foundational focus 
of the NCAA—offering students an opportunity to compete in athletics at the collegiate 
level while garnering an education—will remain the overarching goal for member 
institutions.  
 The Olympic model is not without qualms, though, as regulation over clashing 
sponsorships, recruiting practices, and student-athlete priorities will need to be in place to 
more effectively manage a new system.  And if professional revenue-sharing agreements 
are any indication, some student-athletes may be capable of capturing multi-million-
dollar fair market values, so the necessity for oversight will not change.  The NCAA will 
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retain jurisdiction over all of these items, and much like any other regulating body, it will 
be expected to evolve to the dynamics of the industry.   
 Ultimately, the Olympic model advocates for the traditional aspirations of 
collegiate athletics.  Schools themselves will not have to worry about an arms race of 
funding—which could come at the expense of other sports, or through a further increase 
to student fees.  Outcries over television contracts, coaching salaries, and ostentatious 
facilities will no longer be at center stage if the ones generating the money are allowed 
the right to receive a fair compensation.  And the creation of opportunities in sports and 
academics remains the preeminent principle for member institutions.  Fundamentally, the 
Olympic model bridges the gap between amateur and professional in an evolving 
industry—rightfully rewarding individuals for their value creation, while retaining the 
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